Reference · Chapters 4 & 6
Workload Identity (SPIFFE), mTLS, DPoP & OAuth 2.0 OBO Token Exchange
How every hop between the User, Agent, Egress Gateway, and MCP Tool Server proves both workload identity and delegated human authority.
1. The Four Building Blocks of Hop-by-Hop Agent Identity
When an AI agent calls a database tool server on behalf of a human user, two distinct identities must be proven on every network hop: (1) Workload Identity (which agent process is making the call) and (2) Delegated User Identity (which human user authorized the task, and for which target audience).
| Layer | Mechanism | What It Proves | Threat Closed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Workload Identity | SPIFFE ID + X.509 SVID (principal://agents.global…/reasoningEngines/AGENT_ID) | Issued by the Agent Runtime control plane at startup; zero static JSON keys in environment variables or container layers. | T3 (Credential theft) |
| Transport Layer | Mutual TLS (mTLS) | Both client (agent) and server (Egress Gateway / MCP server) verify each other's X.509 certificates during the TLS handshake. | T5 / ASI07 (Spoofed caller) |
| Proof-of-Possession | DPoP (RFC 9449) | Binds the OAuth token to the agent's private key via a per-request signed DPoP HTTP header covering htm, htu, and ath. Applies to the exchanged token only when the IdP embeds cnf.jkt during the exchange and a proxy in front of the tool server verifies the proof. | T5 (Stolen bearer token replay) |
| Delegated Token Hop | OAuth 2.0 OBO Token Exchange (RFC 8693) or KMS-Signed Context JWT | Swaps inbound token Token_in (aud=web-app) for a 5-minute, audience-locked token Token_obo (aud=orders-mcp, scp=orders:read, act={sub: agent-a}). | T4 / T5 (Token passthrough & BOLA) |
obo_token_exchange_and_verify.py — RFC 8693 Token Exchange & Downstream MCP Verification
import requests from google.auth.transport import requests as google_requests from google.oauth2 import id_token STS_URL = "https://sts.googleapis.com/v1/token" EXPECTED_MCP_AUD = "https://orders-mcp-xyz-uc.a.run.app" ALLOWED_AGENT_ACTORS = {"spiffe://agents.global.org-123.system.id.goog/resources/aiplatform/projects/111/locations/us-central1/reasoningEngines/orders-agent"} def exchange_user_token_for_mcp_target(subject_jwt: str, target_aud: str, scope: str) -> str: # Exchanges inbound Token_in (aud=web-app) for downscoped 5-min Token_obo (aud=orders-mcp) resp = requests.post( STS_URL, json={ "grantType": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange", "resource": target_aud, "audience": target_aud, "scope": scope, "requestedTokenType": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token", "subjectToken": subject_jwt, "subjectTokenType": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt", }, timeout=(2, 5), ) resp.raise_for_status() return resp.json()["access_token"] def verify_obo_token_on_mcp_server(auth_header: str) -> dict: # Verifies Token_obo signature, expiry, exact audience (rejects Token_in), and acting agent claim raw_jwt = auth_header.removeprefix("Bearer ").strip() claims = id_token.verify_oauth2_token(raw_jwt, google_requests.Request(), audience=EXPECTED_MCP_AUD) actor = claims.get("act", {}).get("sub") if actor not in ALLOWED_AGENT_ACTORS: raise PermissionError(f"Unauthorized acting agent: {actor}") return {"user_sub": claims["sub"], "user_email": claims["email"], "actor": actor}