Reference · Chapter 9
Model Armor, Canonical Normalization & Cloud SDP Surrogate Tokenization
Defense-in-depth screening for inbound user prompts and outbound/inbound MCP database tool payloads.
1. Three-Layer Content Protection: Normalize, Screen (Fail-Closed), and De-identify
Content screening is a probabilistic mitigation that backs up our deterministic boundaries (tools.yaml, FORCE RLS, and HITL gates). To prevent attackers from bypassing screening via Unicode tag characters or Base64 encoding inside database text columns, we combine gateway-level Model Armor with canonical normalization and Cloud Sensitive Data Protection (SDP).
| Inspection Point | Component | What It Catches | Failure Mode Prevention |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ingress Edge | Ingress Agent Gateway / ALB Service Extension → Model Armor | Direct prompt injection (T1), jailbreaks, malicious URLs, and sensitive data in user prompts. | Blocks adversarial prompts before the agent container or LLM is invoked. |
| 2. Egress / Tool Return | Egress Agent Gateway (/mcp, /a2a/) + ADK after_tool_callback (normalize()) | Indirect prompt injection (T2) hidden inside database rows (delivery_notes, support tickets), including NFKC homoglyphs, zero-width tags, and Base64 runs. | Fails closed unless invocation_result == SUCCESS and filter_match_state == NO_MATCH_FOUND. |
| 3. Free-Text PII Boundary | Cloud Sensitive Data Protection (SDP) (CryptoDeterministicConfig) | Raw SSNs, credit cards, phone numbers, and emails embedded inside unstructured database notes (LLM02). | Replaces raw PII with deterministic surrogate tokens (keep payload < 0.5 MB per call) so the model never sees raw identifiers. |