End-to-End Audit Attribution (W3C Trace, BigQuery Sink) & Kill Switch Runbook
Linking every SQL query to the human caller and agent turn, enforcing Principal Access Boundaries (PAB), and executing the 3-step emergency kill switch.
1. Closing the Audit Blind Spot (T8)
By default, Cloud SQL, AlloyDB, and Spanner disable DATA_READ and DATA_WRITE audit logs, and logs in _Default expire after 30 days. Our control plane enables Data Access logs across all data stores, routes them to a 400-day partitioned BigQuery sink, propagates W3C traceparent from the client edge into SQL comments/job labels, and streams full agent trajectories via ADK's BigQueryAgentAnalyticsPlugin.
2. ADK BigQueryAgentAnalyticsPlugin & BigQueryLoggerConfig
Attached to the ADK App container (or enabled at scaffold time via uvx agent-starter-pack create . --bq-analytics), BigQueryAgentAnalyticsPlugin streams structured agent lifecycle events directly into BigQuery using the BigQuery Storage Write API, supporting auto-schema upgrades, GCS offloading for multimodal content, and OpenTelemetry trace_id / span_id correlation:
| Parameter / Field | Type / Scope | Security & Governance Purpose |
|---|---|---|
trace_id / span_id | Event Column | OpenTelemetry distributed trace context; joins directly with sqlcommenter traceparent tags in 400-day Database Data Access Audit Logs. |
tool_provenance | Event Metadata | Identifies tool execution origin: LOCAL, MCP, SUB_AGENT, A2A, or TRANSFER_AGENT. |
content_formatter | BigQueryLoggerConfig | Pre-ingestion Python callback that scrubs or redacts residual SSNs, credit cards, or bearer tokens before events leave the container (T2 / LLM02). |
event_allowlist | BigQueryLoggerConfig | Optional filter restricting logged events (e.g., USER_MESSAGE_RECEIVED, LLM_REQUEST, LLM_RESPONSE, TOOL_STARTING, TOOL_COMPLETED, TOOL_ERROR). |
max_content_length & shutdown_timeout | BigQueryLoggerConfig | Caps inline string payloads (with optional GCS bucket offloading for large/multimodal content) and flushes buffered events on container shutdown. |
3. The 3-Step Emergency Kill Switch Runbook
| Step | Action | Command / Control Plane Target | Forensic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Step 1: Block Agent Principal | Apply an immediate IAM Deny policy & Principal Access Boundary (PAB) ceiling on the agent's SPIFFE identity, and remove the agent's egress permission at the Egress Gateway (iap.googleapis.com/resources.egressViaIAP under Unified Access Policies, or roles/iap.egressor under the earlier IAP policy version). | gcloud iam deny-policies create / IAM PAB | Halts all tool and database calls within seconds while keeping the container intact. |
| Step 2: Revoke Delegated Tokens | Revoke the user's sessions and refresh tokens at the identity provider, remove any credentials vaulted in Agent Identity auth manager, and rotate the ALLOWED_KIDS KMS context signing key version if needed. | Identity provider / auth manager / Cloud KMS | Invalidates any in-flight tokens immediately across all MCP servers. |
| Step 3: Preserve Evidence | Snapshot Cloud Run / Agent Runtime revisions, export Memory Bank sessions, and query the 400-day BigQuery audit sink by trace_id and spiffe_id. | BigQuery Audit Sink + Security Command Center | Preserves complete chain of custody for incident response. |